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Introduction
It is frequently claimed that the most innovative feature 
of social protection, in contrast to safety nets, is that it 
has the potential to reduce the vulnerability of poor 
people to the extent that they can manage moderate 
risk without external support. This has led to an expan-
sion of large-scale ‘productive safety net’ programmes. 
The potential to reduce vulnerability so that people can 
move off social protection provision is popularly termed 
‘graduation’.1 However, the vision for graduation rests on 
the assumption of the existence of a large population of 
low-productivity, risk-prone and often poor households. 
Under this scenario, if risk can be underwritten through 
appropriate social protection then significant numbers 
of poor people have the potential to move out of vulner-
ability and extreme poverty into more productive and 
resilient livelihoods.
These claims for the livelihood ‘promoting’ functions 
of social protection and the graduation agenda, lead an 
enquiring mind to ask, what is the theory of change 
behind this graduation vision and under what conditions 
will this theory of change lead to improved outcomes 
for the poor? At the centre of this vision there typically 
exists a focus on resource accumulation and house-hold 
level assets. Surprisingly, we see numerous programmes 
built on this concept, yet little analysis or understanding 
of the requirements and constraints to building sustain-
able pathways to graduation.
The ambition of this paper is to map out the theory 
of change underpinning the notion of graduation and 
to set out, conceptually and empirically, the range of 
enabling and constraining factors that facilitate or under-
mine this change process. We distinguish ‘threshold’ 
graduation (an administrative benchmark that signals 
the point at which a beneficiary is no longer eligible for 
the programme) from ‘sustainable’ graduation (a state 
in which livelihoods have been fundamentally trans-
formed through social protection interventions). 
Furthermore, in keeping with recent work by the authors 
and others (Dorward et al, 2006; Sabates-Wheeler, 
Devereux and Guenther, 2008), we emphasise the exis-
tence of multiple factors working at different levels, 
beyond the household, such as market conditions, 
community investment and scale effects that work to 
constrain or complement each other, and asset usage.
The notion of development coordination (Dorward 
and Kydd, 2004) requires that these different levels and 
initiatives are not analysed in isolation from each other. 
Consider an asset transfer targeted at poor farmers. This 
package may bring them above a specified asset 
threshold, but local markets may be so thin and imperfect 
that any productivity gains are not translated into higher 
incomes because of adverse scale effects. In other words, 
without development coordination (or some way of 
enabling sustainable graduation) the tendency is towards 
a stable low-productivity equilibrium only. A related point 
is the scale of the programme – the size of the livelihood 
package and of the target group. Even if local markets 
function well and are able to absorb increases in produc-
tion, if the livelihood package does not bring enough 
households above a critical threshold there will be negli-
gible multiplier effects and farmers may be unable to 
take advantage of potential economies of scale (see 
Dercon, 2004). These considerations are central to this 
paper and to a full understanding of the process of 
graduation.
This paper is structured as follows. In the following 
section we reflect on the genesis of graduation, in partic-
ular the theories of asset accumulation and asset thresh-
olds which provide the basis of support for graduation. 
After providing some concrete and current examples of 
large-scale programmes built on this concept, we derive 
a ‘theory of change’ that is common to these programmes. 
In the latter part of the paper we critique this theory of 
change by drawing on a variety of literatures and 
programme experience that enables us to lay out a range 
of conditions under which graduation is more or less 
likely to occur. We conclude by highlighting some basic 
considerations that need to be taken into account in 
future social protection programming.
Pathways out of poverty in 
social protection 
programming
The foundations of asset-based graduation
Concern with moving poor and vulnerable people out 
of extreme poverty by helping them to cross ‘asset thresh-
olds’ has received substantial attention in social protec-
tion programming in the last 6-8 years. This has been 
driven primarily by the perennial development concern 
about bringing large numbers of poor people to a posi-
tion where they can productively sustain their own 
livelihoods.
Asset-based approaches to poverty reduction and 
growth emerged primarily from debate in the 1990s that 
challenged conventional measurements of poverty 
based on income, expenditure and consumption aggre-
gates. The debate, and accompanying empirical research, 
redefined the meaning of poverty by placing assets, 
entitlements and livelihood systems at the centre of 
analysis (Sen, 1997; Ellis, 2000). From this foundation, a 
plethora of theoretical models and empirical research 
has emerged. Asset accumulation models focus on the 
acquisition, retention and transmission of assets as funda-
mental to wellbeing. Some proponents of graduation 
have suggested that the pathway to productive liveli-
hoods is linear and incremental, such that increasing 
households’ income over time, through incrementally 
increasing their assets will have the required effect 
(Moser, 1998). The core idea is to use short-term asset 
transfers as a vehicle for sustained economic empower-
ment for economically insecure and marginal house-
holds. Others believe that certain asset thresholds exist 
that need to be crossed if households are to have a chance 
of living poverty-free and productive lives. This implies 
that households living a long way below the critical level 
will require much more provision than those living just 
below it and that incrementalism will not necessarily 
work.
A more sophisticated approach to asset accumulation 
is found in ‘asset threshold’ models, which argue that 
due to the lumpiness of assets and non-linearities in asset 
accumulation, thresholds exist that need to be crossed 
if households are to graduate from poverty and 
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dependence. So for instance, if a farmer needs two oxen 
to make productive use of his plough there is little point 
transferring just one ox to him. Limited empirical work 
supports this threshold argument (Carter et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, this latter work argues that the process of 
asset accumulation and dis-accumulation is dynamic 
with stable and unstable equilibria (Lybbert et al., 2004; 
McPeak, 2004). Once over a threshold the dynamic is to 
move up to a high productivity equilibrium, once below 
the threshold the tendency is to move down to a low-
productivity, subsistence-level equilibrium.
The literature on poverty traps also emphasizes the 
importance of accumulation of assets as necessary for 
sustainable mobility out of poverty (Carter and Barrett, 
2006; Carter and May, 2001; Adato et al, 2006). Barrett et 
al (2006) argue that because assets generate incomes 
for households, asset dynamics underpin structural 
income dynamics. Carter and Barrett (2006) argue that 
low asset households earn low returns on their asset 
holdings, which perpetuates their poverty because they 
earn less investible surplus after meeting their immediate 
consumption needs. This then suggests that thresholds 
for achieving independent sustainable livelihoods 
cannot be defined in terms of (essentially arbitrary) 
income poverty lines, as suggested above, but by the 
crossing of asset and income thresholds associated with 
poverty traps. These are likely to vary with household 
structures (for example gender composition and depen-
dency ratios), with socio-economic and cultural context, 
with livelihood strategies and opportunities, and with 
complex interactions between the different forms of 
capital listed above.
Figure 1 and figure 2 below provide a basic illustration 
of asset accumulation and asset thresholds. In figure 1 
we see income and assets plotted against each other. 
One can think of a level of wellbeing/utility associated 
with different levels of each, but with a high correlation 
between the two (explaining the upward curve of the 
utility function). A move from B to ũ (A’’’) would represent 
a stochastic transition in income, due to say a windfall 
(if upwards), or climatic shock or a price shock (if down-
wards). A shift from A’ to A’’ represents a structural transi-
tion in livelihood due to an accumulation of assets. This 
might come about through an asset transfer or social 
protection programme. The shift from ũ (A’’) to ũ(A’’’) 
comes about due to a structural transition through high 
returns to assets. So as assets increase and returns to 
assets increase this is manifest in higher incomes and a 
positive accumulation path, which has obvious dynamic 
implications. This relationship between asset accumula-
tion, higher productivity and income growth is the basis 
for the graduation vision as described above. The second 
element for this graduation vision is illustrated in figure 
2.
In our simplified figure 2, A* refers to the threshold or 
benchmark above which households or individuals are 
no longer considered in need of social protection 
support. Anp denotes the resource base of a non-poor 
household, Ap and Avp the resource base of a poor and 
very poor household, respectively. Once above threshold 
A*, Carter and others theorise a dynamic accumulation 
of assets such that a household will move on an upwards 
trajectory. Below A* and a downward trajectory is domi-
nant. Thus, moving a household from AVP to Ap through 
an asset transfer will not move the household into a 
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Figure 1. Single-period income and asset poverty lines
Sources: Michael Carter, presentation made at IDS on 10 October 2005.
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positive, dynamic accumulation path, but over time the 
household will return to a low-level equilibrium point.
The practice of programming for graduation
The theories discussed above have increasingly influ-
enced the design of large-scale social protection 
programmes worldwide. In this section we describe three 
well-known large-scale social protection programmes, 
in order to illustrate the graduation visions underpinning 
these programmes and to highlight the similarities in 
vision across programmes and with the thinking 
described above. The examples we draw on are:
1. Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: 
Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR/TUP) in Bangladesh
2. The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 
Ethiopia
3.  Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) in Rwanda
Interestingly, the three programmes all aim at gradu-
ation of beneficiaries out of extreme poverty, but each 
defines graduation in different ways. In Bangladesh, 
graduation is defined in relation to different poverty lines 
– participants graduate when they cross the line from 
‘extreme poverty’ to ‘moderate poverty’. In Ethiopia, 
graduation is benchmarked against productive assets 
– when the value of household assets exceeds a threshold 
that is set in each region, the household is deemed to 
be ‘self-reliant’ and is graduated off the programme. In 
Rwanda, eligibility is defined in ‘social poverty’ terms – 
households graduate when they move from one commu-
nity-defined wealth category to a higher category. 
Although they monitor different indicators, all three 
approaches benchmark graduation against complemen-
tary measures of poverty – income poverty, asset poverty 
and social poverty, respectively.
The fact that two of the three country programmes 
choose to benchmark graduation against a continuous 
variable – income or asset values – highlights the essen-
tially arbitrary nature of these definitions, and raises 
questions about the sustainability of graduation defined 
against a continuous variable. Only in Rwanda is there 
a discrete categorical separation between eligible and 
ineligible households, so graduation is more intuitively 
logical in this context than in the Bangladesh and Ethiopia 
programmes.
Bangladesh: ‘Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty 
Reduction: Targeting the Ultra Poor’ (CFPR/TUP)
Asset transfers are the central feature of two large-scale 
programmes in Bangladesh: ‘Challenging the Frontiers 
of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra-Poor’ (CFPR/
TUP), and the ‘Chars Livelihood Programme’. The thinking 
underpinning both programmes is that productive assets 
can generate future streams of income, so asset transfers 
to asset-poor households could reduce poverty more 
sustainably than food or cash transfers. BRAC’s CFPR/
TUP programme recognised the limitations of market-
based mechanisms, such as microcredit, in reaching the 
chronic poor, and instead offered assets (livestock, leased 
land, tools, seeds) to rural women for use in income-
generating activities, including agriculture (vegetable 
gardening or nursery cultivation).
Two features of the programme contributed to its 
reported success. Firstly, along with the asset, the 
programme also provided a ‘subsistence allowance’ for 
18 months, which was intended to cover part of the 
household’s subsistence food needs until the asset 
transfer started to generate regular streams of income. 
Secondly, the asset transfers were linked to carefully 
selected income-generating enterprises, and skills 
training was provided (Matin et al, 2008; Hashemi and 
Umaira, 2010). The cash transfers ensured that the asset 
was retained rather than being sold to meet pressing 
needs, while skills training ensured that the asset was 
effectively used.
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Figure 2. Asset thresholds, poverty traps and accumulation
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Figure 3 illustrates how this holistic approach, 
combining ‘livelihood protection’ (consumption support, 
savings services) with ‘livelihood promotion’ (skills 
training, asset transfer, access to credit), should in prin-
ciple graduate households from extreme poverty towards 
sustainable livelihoods. This stylised representation can 
be criticised for its assumed linearity – programme 
participants proceed smoothly up the graduation ‘ladder’ 
like an escalator. In reality, livelihoods are unpredictable 
and erratic, especially for the poor, and subject to 
setbacks and shocks. Nonetheless, the project comple-
tion report concluded that the asset transfers had 
resulted in rapid, significant improvement in the liveli-
hoods of extremely poor households, who now enjoy 
more diversified and stable incomes (DFID Bangladesh, 
2006). Between 2002 and 2005, participants living in 
extreme poverty (<$1/day) fell from 89% to 59% (Matin 
et al., 2008: 26).
The ‘Chars Livelihood Programme’ gave ‘capital invest-
ment’ grants to 55,000 poor households in Bangladesh, 
targeted because they were ‘jobless, assetless and land-
less’, to purchase income-generating assets of their 
choice (usually livestock). The asset transfer was comple-
mented with capacity building training sessions and a 
cash stipend for 18 months, partly to support household 
consumption and partly for asset-related costs. Purchases 
of cattle generated a 30% return, contributing to higher 
incomes and livelihood diversification (Marks, 2007). The 
first cohort of beneficiaries increased their average asset 
value from <Tk.2000 to Tk.46,000, and their average 
monthly income by 66%, between 2006 and 2009 
(Conroy and Vignon, 2011). These gains were assessed 
as sustainable because beneficiaries had stopped 
receiving support from CLP two years earlier.
Ethiopia: ‘Productive Safety Net Programme’ (PSNP)
The objective of the PSNP, which is a core component of 
the Government of Ethiopia’s ‘Food Security Programme’ 
(FSP), is “to provide transfers to the food insecure popula-
tion in chronically food insecure Woredas [districts] in a 
way that prevents asset depletion at the household level 
and creates assets at the community level” (Government 
of Ethiopia, 2004). Unlike the annual emergency appeals, 
it was conceived as a multi-year programme (initially for 
five years but subsequently extended) so as to provide 
recipients with predictable and reliable transfers. 
Geographic and community-based targeting are used 
to select beneficiaries. The programme operates in the 
282 most food insecure Woredas in rural Ethiopia, defined 
in terms of their past history of food aid needs. Within 
these localities, local committees called ‘Kebele Food 
Security Task Forces’ choose beneficiaries. Most benefi-
ciary households do Public Works (PW): criteria for selec-
tion into these are that these households are poor (for 
example, they have low holdings of land and/or cattle) 
and food insecure but they also have able-bodied labour 
power. A much smaller proportion of beneficiaries receive 
Direct Support (DS): these households are poorer than 
those receiving public works employment and lack 
labour power; this includes those whose primary income 
earners are elderly or disabled. From 2005-2007, the PW 
component paid beneficiaries either 6 birr per day (0.35 
USD) (increased to 8 birr in 2008 and 10 birr in 2010) in 
cash or 3 kilograms of cereals in return for working, 
depending on where they lived, on labour-intensive 
projects building community assets. These activities are 
supposed to occur between the months of January and 
June so as not to interfere with farming activities which, 
in most regions, occur in the second half of the year.
The notion of graduation has been integral to thinking 
around the PSNP since its inception. Graduation describes 
a process whereby recipients of support move from a 
Figure 3. The BRAC graduation model
Sources: Hashemi and de Montesquiou (2011: 3)
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position of depending on external assistance to a condi-
tion where they no longer need this support, and can 
therefore exit the programme. A ‘Graduation Guidance 
Note’ (FSCB, 2007) describes graduation from the PSNP 
as a transition from ‘chronically food insecure’ to ‘food 
sufficient’, defined as follows:
“A household has graduated when, in the absence 
of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food 
needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand 
modest shocks” (FSCB, 2007: 1).
Under the umbrella of the Food Security Programme 
sits four separate components, three of which contribute 
directly to the graduation vision. These are the PSNP, the 
Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) (formerly 
the Other Food Security Programmes - OFSP) and the 
Complementary Community Investments (CCI) 
programme. While the PSNP is designed to protect 
existing assets and ensure a minimum level of food 
consumption, the OFSP, and more recently HABP, are 
designed to encourage households to increase incomes 
generated from agricultural activities and to build up 
assets through extension and credit services. Furthermore, 
the newer CCI programme has been designed specifically 
for pastoralist regions to provide an enabling environ-
ment that is intended to facilitate widespread graduation. 
For instance, provision of large-scale community-wide 
irrigation systems is provided with the purpose of 
supporting ex-pastoralists’ livelihoods. There are two 
types of graduation in the FSP. The first is graduation off 
the PSNP transfer, after which households are entitled 
to a further year of support through the HABP programme, 
at which point they graduate from the FSP programme.
The figure below, taken from the PSNP 2010-2014 plan 
illustrates the theory behind the two stages of gradua-
tion. Starting at the lower left hand quadrant of the 
diagram, ultra-poor and chronically food insecure house-
holds are targeted with PSNP transfers. Simultaneously, 
intensive support in the form of tailored products and 
financial literacy and savings facilities are encouraged 
and provided so that households can stabilise assets and 
over time move out of poverty. As households become 
less vulnerable and poor, extension services, CCI (where 
appropriate) and business advice (OFSP and HABP) are 
provided. As ‘households’ economic base become 
stronger they reach the first threshold for graduation – 
the first red line denoting graduation from the PSNP. 
These households will likely need further support 
through extension and credit provision, provided under 
the FSP. This will enable them to accumulate assets. At 
some point the households should become resilient 
enough to support themselves and will graduate off the 
FSP altogether. This is the second level of graduation.
Graduation arises from the combined effect of the 
FSP components and other development processes. All 
of these components are required for graduation. 
Therefore, the success of the PSNP cannot be judged by 
graduation rates from the PSNP alone. Whether this posi-
tive process of graduation actually occurs in practice is 
an empirical question and one that is being evaluated 
in ongoing work (Berhane  et al, 2011; Sandler et al., 2010). 
Evaluations of the first phase of the PSNP (2005-2009) 
suggested that there has been minimal graduation of 
beneficiaries. The PSNP has now entered its second 
phase, from 2010-2014, with an expectation by the 
government of Ethiopia that it will end in 2014 with most 
participants no longer needing support.
Rwanda: ‘Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme’ (VUP)
The ‘Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme’ was launched 
2-3 years after the PSNP, and to a large extent builds on 
the same basic design. The VUP aims to reduce extreme 
Figure 4. The graduation pathway from the Food Security Programme, Ethiopia
Source: Food Security Programme 2010-2014: Productive Safety Net Programme, MoARD, August 2009, 
page 17
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poverty in Rwanda through three components. (1) Public 
Works offers short-term employment on community 
infrastructure projects to extremely poor households 
that have adult labour capacity. (2) Direct Support 
provides regular unconditional cash transfers to 
extremely poor households with no adult member who 
is able to work. (3) Financial Services offers low-interest 
loans for productive enterprises, to individuals or 
borrower groups that must include Public Works partici-
pants or Direct Support beneficiaries. All VUP households 
have bank accounts opened for them and are encour-
aged to save.
Households eligible for VUP are identified through a 
community-based social mapping exercise called 
‘Ubudehe’ that classifies local households into 5-7 wealth 
groups. All households allocated to the bottom two 
wealth categories are eligible for the VUP – Public Works 
if they have adult labour capacity, Direct Support if they 
do not. Retargeting occurs every 12 months; any house-
hold that has moved out of the bottom two ‘Ubudehe’ 
categories during the year is deemed to have graduated 
and leaves the VUP.
There is political pressure to graduate households 
quickly, partly to release resources for expanded coverage 
to other sectors, and partly to demonstrate the success 
of the programme. A Household Poverty Survey found 
that 26.2% of households had ‘graduated’ out of the 
bottom two ‘Ubudehe’ categories in sectors where the 
VUP was operational between 2006 and 2009, compared 
to 17.8% in non-VUP sectors, implying that 8.4% of the 
observed graduation was attributable to the VUP (Asselin, 
2010). Ironically, receipt of Direct Support transfers or 
Public Works wages is often sufficient in itself to ‘graduate’ 
beneficiaries within a single annual cycle. However, this 
typically constitutes ‘threshold’ graduation rather than 
‘sustainable’ graduation. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that many households – especially Direct Support benefi-
ciaries with low independent income-generating poten-
tial – are graduated prematurely and, one year later, fall 
back into ‘Ubudehe’ category 1 or 2, becoming eligible 
for the VUP once again (Devereux, 2010).
The recent addition of Financial Services as the third 
component of the VUP offers more potential for sustain-
able graduation.  Loans are invested in approved income-
earning activities – agriculture, handicrafts, small 
businesses – that should generate sufficient profit to 
repay the loan as well as streams of sufficient income. 
Independent income is vital for ensuring that the benefits 
of the VUP persist after direct transfers stop. For this 
reason, an evaluation of the VUP argued that indicators 
of resilience and self-reliance should be added to the 
operational definition of graduation – being assigned 
by one’s neighbours to a certain wealth category at a 
point in time is not sufficient (Devereux, 2010).
Figure 5 illustrates the targeting process for selection 
onto the three components of the VUP. Higher ‘Ubudehe’ 
categories are wealthier than lower categories, so the 
assumption is that households eligible for Financial 
Services have more graduation potential than Direct 
Support beneficiaries. Another innovative feature is that 
households from ‘Ubudehe’ categories >3 (i.e. not eligible 
for Direct Support or Public Works) can apply for VUP 
loans, but only if they form groups or cooperatives with 
households from lower Ubudehe categories. The thinking 
is that the greater resources and entrepreneurial abilities 
of wealthier households will enhance the chances of 
poorer households to generate income and pull them 
up towards graduation, rather than going it alone with 
loans that risk indebting them and impoverishing them 
further.
We see from the examples above very consistent 
visions of pathways to graduation and the building of 
Figure 5. Targeting for graduation on the VUP
Sources: MINALOC, 2010
Working Paper 023 www.future-agricultures.org10
resilient livelihoods for targeted populations. All 
programmes have initiated complementary measures 
such as training of beneficiaries, extension programmes 
(PSNP), access to microfinance (TUP) and bank accounts 
(VUP). The vision of graduation involves a process of 
building sufficient assets for the poor to enable them to 
participate more actively in productive activities.
A Common Theory of 
Change?
The above examples were chosen to demonstrate the 
commonality across programmes in assumptions around 
how asset accumulation through targeted income and/
or asset transfers can enhance the productive capacity 
of farmers who are otherwise constrained from engaging 
in market-based initiatives. Common themes are readily 
identifiable in the three separate programmes – poverty 
targeting, transfers to protect subsistence and support 
livelihoods, complementary activities to enable further 
accumulation and increased productivity, pathways and 
linkages between different interventions, clearly defined 
thresholds for graduation, and coherent visions for 
sustainable poverty reduction. All of these elements 
resonate strongly with the asset accumulation path 
presented earlier and with the threshold stories that 
suggest a point at which households are no longer 
dependent upon external help. The extent to which the 
theoretical approach developed by Moser, Carter, Barrett 
and others has influenced, even initiated, large-scale 
social protection programmes is difficult to establish. 
But it seems more than coincidence that the rise of asset-
based poverty measures in the 1990s and the discourse 
of poverty and asset thresholds just preceded the genesis 
of large-scale social provisioning based exactly on these 
theories.
The three programmes described above are indicative 
of many other social protection programmes that are 
predicated on very similar assumptions. These range from 
emerging national programmes such as ‘Livelihood 
Empowerment Against Poverty’ (LEAP) in Ghana and 
numerous conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in Latin 
America and elsewhere, to a range of NGO interventions 
that simultaneously protect and promote livelihoods. 
We can posit a typically held theory of change uniting 
the majority of these programmes, as follows.
1.   There exists a substantial proportion of poor people/
households who are more risk-averse and less produc-
tive than they could be, due to a) lack of resources 
(income and assets); b) high-risk environments; c) lack 
of credit; d) lack of know-how.
2.    If income/assets/resources are provided, individuals/
households will be able to build their asset base, thus 
building resilience to future shocks (enabling the first 
structural transition in Figure 1 and minimising nega-
tive stochastic transitions as in Figure 1).
3.   Furthermore, the regularity of predictable payments 
will insure against downside risk and enable benefi-
ciaries to move into activities with a higher return/
higher productivity (enabling the second structural 
transition in Figure 1).
4.  Over time beneficiaries’ lives and livelihoods will be 
transformed in a sustainable way, allowing them to 
support themselves so they are able to ‘graduate’ off 
external support (Figure 2).
5. Local multiplier and spill-over effects from more 
productive and market-engaged households will have 
a positive aggregate effect that is bigger than the 
sum of all the individual household effects.
6.  This type of transformation will be ‘virtuous’, in the 
sense that strengthened, more resilient livelihoods 
characterised by higher levels of productivity will have 
a self-sustaining momentum with pro-poor growth 
effects.
‘ Threshold graduation’ and ‘sustainable 
graduation’
All social protection programmes that we are aware of 
usually stop at stage 4 of the process in terms of supported 
interventions – with households graduating off the 
programme as an indicator of success – i.e. threshold 
graduation. The later stages (5) and (6) – sustainable 
graduation – are assumed but not programme-supported 
or empirically tested. Much of the discussion in social 
protection programming refers to graduation in relation 
to a fixed point, usually defined by the programme and 
at which point social protection (or transfers) is with-
drawn. The PSNP is the most progressive programme we 
are aware of in terms of the 2-stage notion of graduation, 
however the two levels are still defined in respect to 
benchmarks and thresholds. But what we are interested 
in, as reflected in the definition of graduation within the 
PSNP documents, is sustained positive change in liveli-
hoods over time, and livelihoods that are able to with-
stand some level of negative shock. It is sensible, then, 
to distinguish threshold/ benchmark graduation (a static 
programme-defined benchmark) from sustainable gradu-
ation (the ability of the household to remain above the 
benchmark in the medium- to long-term via a trans-
formed livelihood).
Threshold graduation describes a process whereby 
recipients of support move from a position of depending 
on external assistance to a condition where they theo-
retically no longer need this support, and can therefore 
exit the programme. This type of graduation reflects a 
concern for social protection programming, because 
policy-makers strive to avoid ‘dependency’ and because 
financial constraints mean that social transfer 
programmes often have limited timeframes and budgets. 
Attempts to operationalise threshold graduation are 
difficult, and benchmarks for graduation can be admin-
istratively complex and/or unrealistically high (Devereux, 
2010).
Sustainable graduation clearly requires threshold 
graduation to be met, however this does not hold in the 
reverse case. This is because sustainability of a strength-
ened livelihood is time-dependent and requires a 
measure of resilience in the face of a negative change. 
We make this distinction because identifying households 
according to a benchmark will attract different questions 
and throw up different constraints (such as hidden infor-
mation and administrative problems) than those 
enabling longer term fulfilment of that benchmark (such 
as weather shocks and access to markets).
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While critical for programming and budgetary 
purposes, the ‘threshold’ emphasis within the graduation 
discussion is somewhat of a ‘red herring’, as a national or 
regional (even district) threshold for graduation will be 
extremely difficult to apply uniformly across the benefi-
ciary population given the massive range in different 
resources and livelihoods pursued. We know from 
evidence that such benchmarks, once attempts are made 
to apply them, become malleable and locally-specific 
for this reason (Berhane et al (2011); Sandford et al. 
(2010)). Therefore, the point of reference in relation to 
long-term outcomes of social protection should be 
whether households are generally experiencing a posi-
tive transformation in their livelihoods such that over 
time livelihoods are strengthened and become more 
resilient. Here we lay out the factors that are likely to 
constrain (and by deduction, enable) sustainable gradu-
ation – or transformed, strengthened livelihoods. While 
critical in programme design, we do not focus on 
threshold graduation as it is subsumed under sustainable 
graduation. Furthermore, threshold graduation, while 
important for programme monitoring and budgeting, 
is primarily an administrative issue.2 Here we are 
concerned with the concept of sustainable graduation 
and the conditions under which it is most likely to be 
achieved. If a case can be made for this, then, and only 
then, setting thresholds becomes relevant.
Factors that enable/constrain the theory of change
Based on the theory of change presented above and on 
the graduation pathways diagrams presented earlier we 
can expound a set of factors that may serve to enable or 
to constrain movement along a pathway to sustainable 
graduation. Our interest here is to understand the 
dynamics underlying the theory of change. To recap from 
figure 1 (and replicated below) A* refers to the threshold 
or benchmark that households or individuals, once 
above, are no longer considered in need of social 
protection support. Anp denotes the resource base of a 
non-poor household, Ap and Avp the resource base of a 
poor and very poor household, respectively.
We frame the following discussion around 5 factors 
that are likely to enable/constrain the process by which 
any one household can move along the productivity-
enhancing pathway. These are:
1) The market context into which households move 
upwards, particularly post-A* (that is, after the asset 
threshold has been reached)
2) The initial resource conditions and efficiency of existing 
assets (moving the function A*)
3) The scale of transfer and coverage (and associated dilu-
tion effects)
4) Household level incentives (and associated dilution 
effects) for moving beyond A*
5) Environmental context (and natural shocks)
These factors may be programme-specific, beneficiary 
specific, community-specific or market-specific. For 
instance, the size of the transfer and the scale of coverage 
is programme-specific, whereas the household incentive 
to share any transfer and thus ‘dilute’ the graduation 
potential is household specific. We talk more about the 
specificity of these factors in the last section.
1. The market context
As discussed in the brief review of programmes, many 
programmes claim that a package of activities is required 
to enable graduation, as for instance the FSP in Ethiopia 
and the VUP in Rwanda. These complementary activities 
typically include one or more of the following: credit 
facilities, training for households, business plan develop-
ment, public works activities. In all the programmes that 
we are aware of the complementary actions are house-
hold-specific and aim at enabling the household to make 
the best use of the transfer as possible.
 
Asset accumulation path
Existence of markets, 
local conditions, 
climate….
Scale, coverage, hidden 
information…..
time
as
se
ts
A*
Avp
Ap
Anp
Figure 6. Graduation pathways – enablers and constrainers
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This complementary activity focus is refreshing and 
important, and it is clear that the comprehensive 
programmes have greater potential for building resilient 
livelihoods than a pure cash transfer approach. But what 
is missing from all of these efforts and the theory of 
change is a bigger view of how transformation and 
strengthening of livelihoods can be sustained over time. 
The answer to this question requires a broadening out 
of the unit of analysis for social protection programming. 
It is not enough just to focus on individuals and house-
holds moving and transforming. Rather, there is a need 
to locate these individuals within a transforming and 
strengthened context so that beneficiary graduation is 
supported within a strengthened context.
To elaborate this point conceptually, take the simpli-
fied graduation pathway as laid out in figure 6. Imagine 
person A, living in the following context: lack of credit 
market, thin labour and land markets and no thriving 
business context, who, over time moves upwards to 
above point A* - a graduation benchmark. Once at A*, 
whatever support (s)he received is stopped and (s)he is 
left to secure an independent livelihood, as depicted by 
the upper right quadrant of figure 3. What is the prob-
ability of being able to do this in the context just 
described? The answer is close to 0. Very quickly the 
individual will fall below A* and again qualify for support. 
In other words what is the point of moving people/house-
holds up and removing support if they will be left within 
a void? What then would be needed to support a trans-
formed livelihood in a sustainable way? It is obvious from 
this simple case that local conditions – that is the thick-
ness of markets, the natural resource base, whether the 
labour market and business sector are thriving – will 
strongly predict the likelihood of sustaining a trans-
formed livelihood (this links to our second critique - ‘initial 
conditions’ - below). Thus there will be differential gradu-
ation success rates depending on the context.
Recent work (Sabates-Wheeler, Devereux and 
Guenther, 2008) emphasises the existence of multiple 
thresholds, such as market thresholds and scale effects 
(discussed later) that work to constrain or complement 
each other, and asset usage. Development coordination 
(Dorward and Kydd, 2004) requires that threshold effects 
are not analysed in isolation from each other. Consider 
a ‘livelihood package’ targeted at poor farmers. This 
package may bring them above a specified asset 
threshold, but local markets may be so thin and imperfect 
that any productivity gains are not translated into higher 
incomes because of adverse scale effects (i.e. prices 
collapse because the market is flooded). In other words, 
without development coordination the tendency is to 
a stable low-productivity equilibrium only. A related point 
is the scale of the programme – the size of the livelihood 
package and of the target group. Even if local markets 
function well and are able to absorb increases in produc-
tion, if the livelihood package does not bring enough 
households above a critical threshold there will be negli-
gible multiplier effects and farmers may be unable to 
take advantage of potential economies of scale (this is 
discussed below).
2. Initial conditions – local and household
Related to market context is the ability of households 
and individuals to take advantage of this market context 
with a given level of assets (at both household and 
community/ local levels). The idea that an economy may 
exhibit endowment sensitivity has roots in the writings 
of Chayanov (1925), who argued “that farm households 
with different endowments of productive resources 
would use those resources in different proportions, with 
different productivities” (quoted in Zimmerman 2000: 
266). Theories of endowment dependency predict that 
asset accumulation primarily depends on initial endow-
ments, with obvious implications for distributional 
outcomes (Barham, Takasaki, and Coomes, 2000). For 
instance, constraints in capital or insurance markets over 
time interact with poorer landholders’ inability to accu-
mulate assets, which leads to poverty traps and livelihood 
vulnerability. In other words, movements out of poverty 
appear to be largely determined by initial endowments. 
The ‘fate of initial endowments’ can be present at a 
community (or local) level as well as at a household level 
– one community may have better quality land, or water 
supply than another, and this may significantly determine 
the development pathway of the households in the 
community.
Local conditions
Dercon (2003: 9) writes, “if growth requires a certain 
threshold of local endowments to take off, then poorly 
endowed areas may well find it hard to escape poverty.” 
In a similar way, distributing (or redistributing) assets 
more equitably in regions that have a very low resource 
base and are densely populated is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on productivity and poverty reduction. 
Evidence from China in the 1980s indicates that commu-
nity characteristics affect the living standards of other-
wise identical households. Geographic poverty traps 
result from initial community characteristics. Unlocking 
the growth potential of asset-poor areas or regions is 
likely to be related to a variety of policy responses, such 
as irrigation provision or health and education provision 
(and other issues to do with market failures). Clearly, any 
programme of asset redistribution or distribution will 
depend on the initial conditions/context.
Household conditions
The implications for graduation of low levels of local 
endowments similarly hold for poorly endowed house-
holds. With a low physical asset base, a solution for house-
holds is often perceived to be provision of a more diverse 
menu of assets or technical packages to choose from. 
But governments or donors may have limited options, 
and extension officers might not be trained to deliver 
advice on a wide array of livelihood activities. Furthermore, 
beneficiary households may not be knowledgeable 
enough, or have inadequate human capital assets to 
sustain a positive change. A related ‘lesson learnt’ is that 
asset transfers need to be accompanied by adequate 
capacity building. It is not just human capital, but physical 
and natural capital that may be lacking. For instance, if 
a beneficiary takes a credit for a seed package but does 
not have the adequate irrigation or land quality to 
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support the package then clearly the investment will 
fail.
A crucial lesson from endowment dependency work 
(as reviewed by Sabates-Wheeler (2005)) is that any policy 
addressing the links between inequality, persistent 
poverty, and agriculture must pay careful consideration 
to various asset portfolios of both households and 
communities and must consider the nature of the activity 
itself.
The efficiency of existing assets
An overlooked consideration for moving households 
towards sustainable change is by shifting the line A* 
downwards. In other words, rather than distributing 
assets and incomes, efforts could be placed on increasing 
the productivity of existing assets. 
3. The scale and coverage of transfer
Size of transfer per capita and dilution 
The issue of the size of transfer to beneficiaries is critical 
to the vision of a graduation pathway. There are two 
separate, but related, points here. The first relates to the 
programme-specific problem of ‘transfer dilution’ 
whereby less than the originally planned per capita 
transfer reaches the intended beneficiary, in the interests 
of including more beneficiaries in the programme. If a 
household or individual receives less than the full 
amount, and the transfer becomes ‘diluted’ across more 
household members or more households than it is 
supposed to be, then the impetus for building livelihood 
sustainability will be weakened and the potential for 
graduation will similarly be weakened. In other words, 
there is a trade-off between covering many households 
with smaller amounts of transfer per household member, 
versus targeting less households with higher (and appro-
priately calculated) levels of transfer for all household 
members.
A second problem of dilution is beneficiary-specific 
and presents the same outcome as that just described. 
This is when transfers are shared across households or 
individuals by the beneficiaries themselves. For instance, 
if a beneficiary household shares its transfer with a non-
beneficiary household then the anticipated effect of the 
transfer is diluted and is equivalent to partial family 
targeting.
What are the implications of partial targeting and 
sharing of transfers for the theory of change? If the 
transfer/ asset value has been calculated appropriately, 
in the sense that the amount and package provided has 
the potential to produce productivity-enhancing effects, 
then it is obvious that less than this amount will under-
mine the likelihood of the hypothesised effect. The dilu-
tion may, however, mean that more people are able to 
secure consumption. While still a positive outcome, this 
is not the vision for graduation. Unfortunately, the 
formula for what constitutes an ‘appropriate’ amount 
takes us to the thorny and immensely complicated issue 
of how thresholds/benchmarks are set and the content 
and levels of complementary initiatives that support 
income and asset transfers. We have already touched on 
this above and it is not our intention to provide a compre-
hensive review of threshold graduation criteria, just to 
note that this is critical to the assumptions of productivity 
effects from ‘full household targeting/full targeting.’
Coverage and agglomeration
A further factor influencing the pathway to sustained 
change results from multipliers (or externalities) related 
to scale effects. While the assumption of household-
specific externalities/multipliers is central to the virtuous 
theory of change outlined above, no consideration is 
given to the multipliers (or what we refer to here as local 
agglomeration effects) that occur when large numbers 
of households/individuals become ‘strengthened’ simul-
taneously. When large numbers of economic units are 
located in proximity to each other and seeking to increase 
production and investment, this affects the environments 
in which they operate (think of Silicon Valley for instance 
and the innovation that is supported through the prox-
imity of enterprises). This is true, for example, of the 
natural environment, where large numbers of people 
harvesting natural resources may lead to their degrada-
tion, and it is true of markets, where large numbers of 
people buying (or selling) products or services may lead 
to price rises (or falls). The occurrence of agglomeration 
effects when change happens at large scale, as estab-
lished by models of new economic geography (see Fujita, 
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Figure 7. Local agglomeration effects with high coverage of asset transfers
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Krugman and Venables, 2000 for a detailed description 
of these models), can support a much higher rate of 
innovation and transformation over time than when 
change happens incrementally and at a household level.
Scale, in relation to social protection programming, 
can refer to both the size of the transfer and resources 
given per beneficiary or community, as well as the size 
of the coverage of the programme within one geographic 
area. For instance, giving transfers to 90% of a designated 
local population will have different effects than giving 
transfers to only 10% of the same population. Furthermore, 
the size of the transfer will also affect the change (as 
discussed above).
Figure 7 illustrates the theory behind agglomeration 
effects. In Period 1 few individuals have assets and thus 
the community has a low asset base. Agglomeration 
translates into returns to individual and community 
assets. During period one, few households have few 
assets and the growth rate of assets is low. The larger the 
proportion of people with assets the higher the growth 
rate of those assets due to positive externalities. These 
positive spillovers increase at a decreasing rate and even-
tually level off at a higher level equilibrium growth, similar 
in many ways to the dynamic asset story as depicted in 
Figure 2.
4. Household-level incentives and dependency
With all forms of social assistance, concerns exist about 
whether their provision will make recipients dependent 
upon them, thereby undermining (in this case) the pros-
pects for graduation. It is necessary to re-emphasise here 
that transfers made to labour-constrained poor people 
(e.g. older persons or persons with severe disabilities) 
may well lead to ‘welfare dependency’, as there is no 
expectation that this group will ever graduate. However, 
for beneficiaries that have labour capacity and the poten-
tial to raise their productivity and move beyond A* (in 
Figure 6), dependency on transfers could severely under-
mine the programme’s graduation outcomes.
There are several possible pathways from receipt of 
social transfers to dependency. One is ‘moral hazard’ – 
beneficiaries could choose to work less and live off social 
transfers instead – but this requires transfers to be 
provided at a level and with a regularity and predictability 
that will instil confidence among beneficiaries that they 
are adequate and will continue indefinitely. This is 
unlikely with most social protection programmes in lower 
income countries, which are more often discretionary 
and time-bound than guaranteed and permanent, and 
there is little evidence for social transfer beneficiaries 
‘choosing leisure’. A second pathway is ‘non-productive 
use of transfers’ – instead of investing transfers in liveli-
hood promoting activities and assets, transfers are 
consumed so that the household stays below graduation 
thresholds that are defined by income or assets.3 A final 
pathway is ‘concealment’ – beneficiaries may attempt to 
hide true information about their income and assets, so 
as to continue to appear eligible when in fact they might 
have crossed a graduation threshold. All of these behav-
ioural responses to the delivery of social transfers can 
result in programmes failing to achieving their long-term 
objectives, and generating large-scale dependency 
rather than large-scale graduation.
5. Environmental context
Poor households face a ‘vulnerability spectrum.’ Most 
social protection programmes are inadequate to address 
the complex and multi-dimensional nature of vulnera-
bility in rural communities. The notion of graduation is 
implicitly linear – it suggests a progression up an income 
scale – but livelihoods in rural settings are erratic and 
characterised by uncertainty. Farming communities face 
erratic weather and other threats to crop production and 
livestock herds. Even if a household appears to have 
passed a consumption, income or asset threshold at a 
point in time (say, after three years of receiving social 
cash transfers), it is difficult to predict whether the house-
hold is about to suffer a major shock (e.g. a drought, 
conflict or disease outbreak) that will decimate its harvest 
or herd, leaving the household acutely vulnerable to 
hunger, destitution and even death.
In such an intrinsically vulnerable and unpredictable 
livelihood context it is highly unlikely that graduation 
will be linear or a one-step procedure. Furthermore, many 
who are able to graduate from a programme in one year, 
may face a face a range of unpredictable shocks that 
leave them in need of support once again. For this reason, 
we believe that households ‘transition’ from different 
states of vulnerability and so an objective of any social 
protection programme must be to map out ‘pathways’ 
to sustainable livelihoods. In other words, it may be better 
to talk of graduation between different programmes that 
incrementally build resilience. Perhaps a farmer would 
graduate from food transfers, to fertilizer subsidies to 
micro-credit, for instance. In this sense there is a need 
to identify multiple thresholds while at the same time 
simplifying benchmarks.
An additional problem emerges when we recognise 
that the environmental context is actually in a state of 
flux, as this has implications for how we empirically iden-
tify the asset threshold, A*. Changes in climate, in local 
level environmental conditions and asset portfolios as 
a result of shocks mean that A* cannot be a fixed point 
and must adapt to changing circumstances. What may 
be considered a suitable package one year, may not be 
suitable the following year.
A Typology of Enablers and Constrainers 
From the discussion above it is useful to develop a user-
friendly way of identifying a range of enablers and 
constrainers of graduation. So for instance, the local 
irrigation or land conditions may enable or constrain the 
likelihood of graduation and these are community/
location-specific, whereas the limited coverage of a 
transfer is programme-specific. Throughout the discus-
sion above we have identified a variety of constraints as 
being related to specific factors. Box 1, below, provides 
a typology of these factors.
Programme-specific constrainers/enablers emerge 
solely from the way the programme was designed or 
implemented. For instance, one of the intentions of the 
PSNP in Ethiopia is to implement full-family targeting 
(FFT). FFT is a targeting rule that all members of eligible 
PSNP households should be listed as clients of the 
programme. This is supposed to help client households 
to graduate by providing a transfer for every household 
member and prevent dilution of transfers. Full-family 
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targeting is critical to the national vision of pathways for 
graduation. However, until very recently the bulk of distri-
bution at the local level has followed a partial family 
targeting approach so that more households in total 
could receive some transfer. This partial targeting lowers 
the likelihood that graduation will take place, mainly 
because the size of transfer per household is less than 
intended. Where the partial family targeting actually does 
constrain graduation, pathways need to be investigated 
empirically. In Rwanda, the initial decision to retarget 
beneficiaries every six months proved to be a constrainer: 
this period was too short for graduation to have occurred 
and some beneficiaries were graduated prematurely. The 
practice was subsequently modified so that retargeting 
now occurs annually.
An example of a beneficiary-specific constrainer/enabler 
would be lack of desire to graduate. In the VUP, Direct 
Support beneficiaries who have been graduated argue 
that they have no labour capacity and therefore need 
longer-term support; Public Works participants ask to 
be reassigned to Direct Support which has no work 
requirement and transfers almost three times as much 
income as Public Works. On the other hand a beneficiary-
specific enabler could be the voluntary savings made by 
beneficiaries. In the VUP most beneficiaries are choosing 
to save some of their income transfers; this builds on a 
tradition of informal rotating savings and credit associa-
tions (ROSCAs). In the PSNP an enabler could relate to 
the size of land holding and access to water – beneficia-
ries with greater land size and access to water are 
perceived to be more likely to graduate.
Community-specific enablers/constrainers are often 
discussed in Ethiopia’s FSP, particularly within the context 
of strengthening of livelihoods in lowland/pastoralist 
areas. The Complementary Community Investment (CCI) 
programme is intended to provide large-scale invest-
ments, such as irrigation infrastructure and watershed 
management, as a way of facilitating strengthened liveli-
hoods at a community level. Under the VUP a similar 
vision exists for large-scale investment, however, in many 
communities there are limited opportunities for large-
scale infrastructure projects that can absorb substantial 
amounts of labour; in these locations Public Works 
employment must be rationed or rotated. As with the 
beneficiary-specific enablers, the level and quality of 
resources as the community level is perceived to be a 
good predictor of graduation potential.
Market-specific constrainers/enablers could relate to 
the limited market context (as discussed at length above) 
or may be related to price changes and inflation. Unlike 
under the PSNP, in the VUP Public Works daily wages 
paid are equal to, or higher than, local market wage rates 
in most VUP communities. This is likely to facilitate gradu-
ation. However, there are limited markets for products 
in many of the areas where the VUP is implemented. 
Many activities for which VUP loans have been taken 
have uncertain markets (e.g. rearing rabbits for meat and 
cows to sell milk) and there is a risk of over-supply if too 
many borrowers in an area take loans for the same activi-
ties. On the other hand, a market enabler has been identi-
fied for VUP borrowers living near Kigali, the capital city, 
where a high demand for eggs means they have to be 
imported from Uganda; local producers have a ready-
made market because they can deliver eggs to local 
traders and urban consumers at lower cost.
Finally, environment-specific constrainers/enablers exist 
because of the unpredictable and insecure environments 
that many beneficiaries live in. Natural disasters, severe 
weather conditions, seasonal swings in rainfall and 
temperatures, all define the context within which benefi-
ciaries can or cannot take advantage of social protection 
programming. In Rwanda, relatively high and predictable 
rainfall constitutes an environmental enabler: VUP Public 
Works projects are maximising the agricultural benefits 
of this rainfall by creating terracing and irrigation infra-
structure. In Ethiopia, by contrast, unpredictable rains 
are an environmental constrainer, since a poor rainfall 
A. Programme-specific constrainers (enablers)
•	 Inappropriate	benchmarks
•	 Inadequate	income	transfers
•	 Absent	or	inappropriate	complementary	
programmes and activities
•	 Dilution	of	transfers
- Partial (full) family targeting
•	 Inflexible	(index-linked)	transfer	rate	in	context	of	
price changes
•	 Scale	effects
- Coverage of programme
B. Beneficiary-specific constrainers (enablers)
•	 Lack	of	desire	to	graduate		(dependency)
•	 Dilution	of	the	transfer
- Sharing of resources between families 
•	 Initial	household	asset	base
•	 Business	know-how
C. Community/location-specific constrainers 
(enablers)
•	 Initial	community	infrastructure	and	asset	base
- Land
- Water/irrigation
•	 Community	level	investment	activities	(large	
scale)
•	 Community	spirit
•	 Decentralisation
D. Market-specific constrainers (enablers)
•	 Changes	in	prices
•	 Lack	of	markets	(goods,	labour	and	credit)
•	 Scale	effects
- Agglomeration effects (size of graduate pool)
E. Environment-specific constrainers (enablers)
•	 Climatic	changes/	natural	shocks
Box 1. Constrainers (enablers) of 
graduation
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can undermine PSNP livelihood packages that aim to 
promote crop and livestock production.
Conclusions
As the notion of graduation begins to dominate the social 
protection domain it is worth stepping back and 
reflecting on what is meant by graduation and under 
what conditions it can be achieved. In this paper we have 
attempted to do just this – recognising that graduation 
is centrally concerned with building resilient livelihoods 
(via asset transfers and the underwriting of risk), for the 
ultimate objective of poverty reduction. As well as 
unpacking and critiquing the theory of change that 
underpins many current large-scale graduation 
programmes, we have laid out a theoretical discussion 
on the enablers and constrainers to graduation. Some 
conclusions we draw are the following.
1. Graduation thresholds are critical for programming 
and budgeting purposes, because they define eligi-
bility for and exit from many social protection 
programmes, which determines their scale and cost. 
However, thresholds deflect attention from the bigger 
objectives of social protection programming – that 
of transformed and sustainable livelihood improve-
ment. These bigger objectives cannot be measured 
in terms of benchmarks, so new indicators for evalu-
ating graduation must be developed.
2. Programming for graduation needs to be placed in a 
broader context of market and community thresholds, 
initial assets levels of households and community, the 
likelihood of agglomeration effects, and the unpredict-
ability of the environment.
3. If ‘context’ as an enabler or constrainer to graduation 
is taken seriously, then a programme theory of change 
will need to include actions that address context 
constraints (such as markets, infrastructure, seasonal 
shocks) in order to facilitate sustainable graduation.
4. Critically, designers and implementers of social protec-
tion programmes need to focus on the enabling envi-
ronment for strengthening livelihoods, which implies 
a coordinated approach to development, if functional 
and therefore sustainable graduation is to be realised.
The increasing focus on achieving graduation from 
social protection programmes represents a commend-
able drive for cost-effectiveness and for linking the ‘social’ 
objectives of development interventions with ‘economic’ 
goals such as poverty reduction, growth and sustainable 
livelihoods. However, it is important not to lose sight of 
the primary purpose of social protection, which is to 
provide effective safety nets or insurance against down-
side risk for people who are already poor or vulnerable 
to becoming poor(er). A clear distinction must always 
be retained in social protection programming between 
individuals and households who have graduation poten-
tial and those who do not (e.g. those who have no labour 
capacity).
Social transfers are an inadequate instrument on their 
own for building sustainable livelihoods and resilience 
against fluctuations and shocks. Social transfers can be 
effective in smoothing consumption and protecting 
existing assets, but complementary interventions are 
needed to increase incomes and assets to the point where 
participants are ready to graduate from the programme. 
Delivering both ‘livelihood protection’ and ‘livelihood 
promotion’ requires a ‘package’ approach, including both 
support to household consumption and support to 
livelihoods.
The evidence base on whether ‘threshold’ graduation 
(crossing an asset or poverty line) amounts to ‘sustainable’ 
graduation (staying above the threshold after social 
protection support is withdrawn) is very thin at this early 
stage. However, there are indications from some 
programmes that many graduates fall back below the 
threshold within a short time period, suggesting that 
graduation was premature.
Although programming for graduation is invariably 
reduced to crossing thresholds defined in terms of 
poverty or poverty proxies (e.g. assets), we argue that 
this is inappropriate. Instead, graduation should be 
conceptualised and assessed in terms of resilience – 
enhanced ability to withstand moderate shocks without 
damaging losses. The next challenge is to identify robust 
indicators of resilience that can be introduced to social 
protection programmes as monitorable graduation 
thresholds.
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End Notes 
1  Not all households can be expected to  ‘graduate’ from social protection programmes. Some vulnerable and poor 
people, such as the elderly poor or people living with severe disabilities, are likely to require social assistance over a 
long, if not life-long, period. This paper deliberately does not deal with these groups.
2  Whether and how a benchmark can be appropriately set is another large discussion that requires further 
discussion and empirical analysis, but is not the focus of our attention here.
3  Such behaviour could be strategic – choosing not to invest or accumulate, to remain eligible for programmes 
where income or asset ownership is a criterion for continuing to receive benefits. Of course, not all consumption is 
‘wasteful’, and some consumption is a form of investment – e.g. well fed children should perform better in school, 
improving their future earnings potential.
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